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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Japan: The Kishi government is confident that the Supreme Court will reverse the lower-court opinion that the presence of US troops in Japan is unconstitutional. A ruling is not likely prior to the upper-house elections in June.

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OK
Cyprus: The provisional cabinet for the new Cyprus Government which Archbishop Makarios named on 2 April represents a compromise between the "old guard," represented by Makarios himself, and the "young blood," represented by former EOKA leaders. Makarios, probable president of the new Cypriot state, has assured personal dominance by retaining the key posts of foreign affairs and finance and by including some of his personal followers. Two of the seven ministers named from the Greek Cypriot community are former terrorist leaders. The ministries of Defense, Health, and Agriculture will be filled by Turkish Cypriots. The provisional cabinet will function until Cyprus becomes an independent republic next February.

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III. THE WEST

OK
Bolivia: (The government evidently expects violence in the tin-mining area in the next few days) President Siles has postponed a scheduled state visit to Argentina. The tin miners, who are armed, object to the government's insistence, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, on removing subsidies for mine commissaries. (Page 6)

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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Dalai Lama Enters India

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The Chinese Communists already are concerned that a new spate of unfavorable publicity will follow any statements made by him on the Tibetan situation. On 2 April, Peiping charged that he crossed the Assam border near Bhutan "under duress of the traitors," which suggests that the Chinese plan to refute any of his statements as made under compulsion.)

(Peiping now may demand that India return the "kidnaped" 23-year-old Bhuddist leader to Tibet. The Chinese also are likely to make further charges that Kalimpong has been used by "imperialists" as a "center" of the revolt and imply the Indians have thus abetted the rebellion. On 1 April, a Chinese Communist news agency report suggested that Nehru was giving comfort to the rebels when he received a visit from the "traitor" former Tibetan prime minister, who returned to Kalimpong "satisfied with the talk with Nehru.")

(New Delhi is not likely to force the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet against his will. Nehru probably will try, however, to isolate him from the press and restrict his political activity in order to lessen friction with Peiping.)

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Early Japanese Supreme Court Decision on Legality of US
Troops in Japan Unlikely

The Japanese Supreme Court is not expected to rule for at least four months on the controversial opinion of the Tokyo district court that the presence of US forces in Japan is unconstitutional. Fear that charges of submission to political pressure would be raised against the court could delay the final ruling even longer. However, the government is confident that the lower court's decision will be reversed because of the "progovernment" views of the justices and because of the large number of court decisions which have upheld the validity of the US-Japanese security treaty and the administrative agreement.

In the interim, the Socialists will exploit the issue in the local elections this month and in the upper-house elections in June. They may be able to offset the damage to their position which resulted from their recent endorsement of Chinese Communist objectives in Asia. The issue also gives added impetus to a nationwide Socialist campaign, conducted as a joint front with the Communists and leftist labor, against the government's plan to revise the security treaty.

The initial reaction of the Japanese press to the Tokyo court's ruling was critical, but largely on other than legal grounds. The press suggested that a question so vital to national interests and world peace is not subject to legal interpretation.

Foreign Minister Fujiyama has urged Ambassador MacArthur to continue their informal discussions on revising the security treaty to offset the growth of any impression that the negotiations are stalled because of doubt about the status of either US or Japanese forces. Ambassador MacArthur comments that if the Supreme Court overrules the lower-court decision in clear-cut terms, the over-all effect of the public and legal debate may be a healthy clarification of Japan's right to take adequate steps for self-defense, including specific judicial sanction for US-Japanese defense arrangements.



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Provisional Cypriot Cabinet Represents Compromises

Leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots made public their choices for a provisional cabinet on 2 April. The list is a compromise between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and between the "old guard" of Greek Cypriots, represented by Archbishop Makarios himself, and the "young blood," represented by former leaders of the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA. Although EOKA has been formally disbanded, its leaders recently announced the formation of a new political party--the United Democratic Reform Front.

Makarios, who is slated to become the chief executive of the new Cypriot state, reserved for himself the posts of foreign affairs and finance, apparently in order to keep a firm grip on the government and to preclude other choices which might have promoted further disunity among the Greek Cypriots. Apparently no concessions were made to the strong Communist element on Cyprus, which appears to be playing a waiting game until personal rivalries and factional differences end the surface unity of the more conservative elements among Greek Cypriots.

The provisional cabinet is intended to become the formal government when Cyprus is proclaimed an independent republic next February. [REDACTED]

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Bolivian Government Expecting Violence

The Bolivian Government evidently expects violence in the tin-mining area between now and the 9 April celebration of the 1952 revolution, and President Siles has postponed a state visit to Argentina scheduled for 6 April. Armed tin miners violently oppose the government's assurance to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to eliminate subsidies to mine commissaries. This assurance, given in mid-March during a bitter two-week strike over maintenance of subsidized prices in the commissaries, brought Bolivia \$500,000 in ICA funds. The IMF, however, is insisting that the assurance be implemented before further funds are made available. The Bolivian Central Bank's foreign-exchange deficit has risen to \$2,300,000, and significant exchange receipts are not likely before mid-April.

(The Bolivian Government apparently also faces the harassment of a new rightist plot which is unlikely to be successful but could contribute to violence. The plotters are said to have labor, police, and army support)

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